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ABSTRAK
Walaupun berhasil mendapatkan suara terbanyak di Jakarta pada pemilihan umum
tahun 2004, PKS nampak sulit untuk mewujudkan keuntungan politik tersebut dan
mendapatkan kekuasaan eksekutif dengan memenangkan pemilihan kepala daerah
di Jakarta. Setelah kekalahan dengan selisih yang relatif tipis pada pemilihan kepala
daerah tahun 2007, kandidat dari partai tersebut juga gagal untuk bersaing dengan kandidat lain di putaran kedua pada pemilihan kepala daerah berikutnya. Dengan menerapkan beberapa teori yang menjelaskan kandidat bekerja di pemilihan lokal, tulisan
ini mendiskusikan beberapa kemungkinan penjelasan mengenai kegagalan Hidayat
Nur Wahid, kandidat dari PKS, pada pemilihan kepala daerah di Jakarta pada tahun
2012. Tulisan ini berpendapat bahwa walaupun ada kemungkinan faktor agama, dalam
hal ini Islam, bekerja di dalamnya, bukanlah kandidat dari partai Islam seperti PKS
yang terdepan dalam memanfaatkannya mengingat ada faktor lain yang juga bekerja
seperti karakter pribadi, sumber politik dan faktor media. Dalam kasus ini, kegagalan
untuk menawarkan kandidat dengan kemampuan untuk mengatasi masalah-masalah
perkotaan merupakan faktor yang membuat pemilih perkotaan untuk cenderung tidak
berada pada pihak kandidat dari partai Islam, walaupun mereka memiliki kesamaan
identitas relijius.
Kata kunci: politik perkotaan, partai Islam, kandidat partai, pemilihan kepala daerah,
identitas relijius
ABSTRACT
Despite its success in obtaining more votes in the 2004 general election in Jakarta than
the previous election in 1999, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) has turn its voter support into local executive power by winning a gubernatorial election in the capital. After
a narrow defeat in the 2007 local election, the party’s candidate who had a respectable
reputation also failed to further its bid for the second round of the following local election. By applying the existing possible explanations of urban candidacy in local elections, this paper aims at discussing the possible explanations for the failure of Hidayat
Nur Wahid, the PKS candidate, in the 2012 gubernatorial election. The paper argues
that in spite of the likely influence of religion, in this case, Islam, the party’s candidate is
at the forefront position to maximise it since such other factors as personal character,
* The writer is a lecturer at Department of Political Science, Universitas Indonesia. He is also
currently an Honorary Research Fellow at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University
of Exeter, UK.

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2016

1

Jurnal Politik, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4

6

JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 2, NO. 1, AGUSTUS 2016

political resources and media are playing role in this context. In this case, the failure
to offer a candidate with the capacity to tackle urban problems makes urban voters
unlikely to be on their side, although they share the similar religious identity.
Keywords: urban politics, Islamic party, party candidate, local election, religious identity
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v2i1.80

I N T RODUC T ION

In the study of urban politics, the analysis of Islamist’s involvement in
city electoral process is relatively rare, leaving mostly on the cases of
Turkish RP (Refah Partisi – Welfare Party) and AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi– Justice and Development Party) and Lebanese Hezbollah.
The rarity is surely understandable since democratic process, a possible
arena for Islamic political organizations or movements to compete is
hardly found in majority of Islamic countries in the region. Only following the recent uprising in the Middle East have more opportunities
existed for increasingly competitive elections. However, it will take more
time, years if not decades, to develop stable and consolidated democracy
and transfer it to local level. The political changing in several Middle
Eastern countries known as the Arab Spring has offered a little to provide competitive political arena and seeking more cases of Islamists’
activism in a local electoral is becoming even more challenging.
In Turkey, there are several studies focusing on the way the ‘Islamic
movement’ positions itself in urban politics. At the social level, the
Gülen movement, also known as Hizmet, is one of the major social
forces in mobilising religious citizens to penetrate public sphere (e.g.
Yavuz 2013; Topal 2013) whilst at political level, the RP and AKP dominate the dynamics of urban politics by winning significant numbers of
local election in many cities (e.g. Gulalp 1999; Çarkoglu 2009). The
most influential person in contemporary Turkish politics, Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, is a product of local politics after securing the governorship
of Istanbul in 1994, from where he developed his popularity through
impressive leadership in the city of more than ten million residents
(Çınar 1997). Social and anthropological studies have investigated the
growing influence of the RP and AKP perceived to have the Islamic
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol2/iss1/4
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background. They also investigated the ability to be part of daily life
expression in urban areas (White 2005), representing and helping lowerincome citizens in squatter areas (Yalcintan and Erbas 2003, 100-101);
and combining with increasing number of middle class with more religious character (Insel 2003; Yavuz 2006) as the contributing factors
of their increasing popularity. Those aspects are significant in the increasing political support to the RP, until its closure in 1998, and the
AKP from 2002 until recently, at least in maintaining power through
electoral triumph.
A number of studies on Muslim activism in local context has been
conducted by scholars. However, only a few countries have been mentioned in the urban political studies in Islamist activism. Bayat’s studies (1996, 2005, & 2007) proposed the term post-Islamism to bring
additional social aspects of urban Muslim’s life where new forms of
Islamism grow. In this term, Islamism is all about social expression, not
necessarily politics, of Muslims in big cities referring to the growing
role of open and public space in Iran, especially Tehran, with some
aspects of the rising of Islamic influence at a social level in urban areas
in Egypt. Another study conducted by Ismail (2000) focuses on the Islamic activism in the urban setting of Cairo. Nevertheless, the activists
studied in the article are challenging the local government outside the
system and considering applying violent approach rather than getting
involved in formal local party politics and elections. Thus with only
limited opportunity for free and competitive election in urban areas
in the region, the possibility of examining the involvement of Islamic
movement is relatively limited. However, it is remarkable to see rare
studies of Islamist political activities in unlikely place such as Saudi and
Israel cities. In Saudi Arabia, Kraetzschmar (2010) is able to capture
the Islamist success in mobilizing urban votes whereas, in Israel, Peled
(2001) sees how the Islamist movement spreads its influence at Israel’s
municipal as well as national levels.
Despite Indonesia’s relatively minor position in the study of Muslims
in general, with its new democratic regime, it offers more opportunity
in looking for Islamic movements or organizations competing in more
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2016
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regular and stable electoral process. The opportunity only came nearly
two decades ago in 1998 when Soeharto stepped down after 32 years
in power. Indonesia then entered the Reform Era and since then it
has strived to develop a more open political landscape by embracing
democracy in spite of the fact that it has to encounter several major
obstacles (King 2003). It is now categorized as a free country in Freedom House index to replace Thailand and Malaysia that have been
previously categorised as free country in Southeast Asia. In local areas,
it brought significant changes when the amended constitution and new
laws require a direct election at every local level of province, city, and
regency (Antlov 2002). Despite all suspicious flaws indicated by scholars
(Mietzner & Aspinall 2010, 5-8), every level of local elections now has
at least two electoral events directly electing a governor and mayor or
regent to win the executive positions by popular votes. Therefore, the
local elections are still competitive for the parties and candidates.
Hence, Indonesian local elections now become an excellent place
for examining the dynamic of Islamic parties in urban politics, especially in city elections, as the country has experienced regular elections
at the local level for almost two decades. Among five Islamic or Muslim
based parties, the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – Prosperous Justice
Party) captured more attention as it succeeded to garner 23 percent
of votes in the capital Jakarta and became the most popular party in
the 2004 general election in the capital city. The party mostly supported by young Muslim activists in major urban areas was established
following the fall of the authoritarian regime. Categorically, the PKS
represents Islamist movements in Indonesia (Hasan 2012) and for the
party, the achievement should be materialized into local political success by winning the gubernatorial position. However, the mission failed
at the gubernatorial election in 2007 although its candidate gained
44% of votes as the rest of 19 parties united to support their sole candidate (Woodward 2008). After losing the 2007 Jakarta election with a
relatively narrow gap, the party has recorded a number of setbacks in
elections in the capital, either at local or national level. Its candidate
in the 2012 election only secured 11 percent and failed to proceed to
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol2/iss1/4
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second round; this was way below its 19 percent in the 2009 national
election. It marked the failure to either transform its previous success
or at least maintain its popular support in the national elections as it
dropped to third place in 2014 national election with only 11 percent
of votes. Therefore, there is a significant circumstance to look at the
PKS’s performance in the capital as it gradually loses supporters from
one election to another.
This paper aims to look at the performance of the PKS in the 2012
Jakarta gubernatorial election to represent the challenges confronted
by Islamist party in relatively competitive urban politics with predominantly Muslim voters. The party is a good case to be examined due
to its achievement in becoming the most popular party in the 2004
general election in Jakarta and its garnering 42 percent of the votes for
its gubernatorial candidate in 2007. With these achievements, there was
optimism among party members that it would have good performance
in the 2012 gubernatorial election as well. At least, it should have been
able to maintain its 19 percent of the votes at 2009 national election.
However, despite its potency to seize or at least be competitive for this
strategic position, the party’s candidate failed to attract adequate votes
in Jakarta even to qualify for the second round. In general picture, the
investigation on how the party’s candidate strived to position and campaign in front of the public for a local election can reveal the problematic nature of an Islamic party in the democratic process. By looking at
its 2012 candidacy in a bid to win the local election, this paper argues
that religious identity is not a guarantee for an Islamic party to convince
the majority of Muslim voters in the capital whose Muslim population
is around 85 percent. Consequently, other factors that also influence the
voters inside the ballot box in the context of local urban politics must be
taken into account accordingly. Miichi (2014) suggests the importance
of religion in the Jakarta’s gubernatorial election where the two pairs
going through the second round had strived to carefully manage their
ties to Islam at different degrees. However, applying his argument to a
party that is already Islamic seems peculiar as it sees Islam as a trump
card for its magnitude of performance in the local election.
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2016

5

Jurnal Politik, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4

10

JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 2, NO. 1, AGUSTUS 2016

P OL I T IC A L PA RT Y, C A N DI DAT E ,
A N D L O C A L E L EC T ION

What are other voting-related elements that could be influential factors
in the local urban elections? Examining local elections using behavioral approach is one of the major methods of studying urban politics
since the 1960s. Although new paradigms such as neo-Marxists’ urban
protest dimension and international dimension of economic force to the
electoral process have been developed significantly, the behavioral approach has still survived alongside rational choice theory and discourse
analysis (Stoker 1998).
Despite its prolonged research, the behavioral study of the local election is still underdeveloped compared to the national level. Although
there are already several studies and data collection that have been
conducted by political scientists (Marschall, Shah & Ruhil 2011, 1), the
situation since the 1960s and 1970s remains unchanged until recently
(Stoker 1998, 127). In the context of Indonesia, most of the studies are
focusing on political process on how candidates organized and arranged
their campaign strategies in relation to the consolidation of democracy
(Buehler 2009). In particular, they are focusing on how democracy
works in a local election in relation to the dynamics of party politics
(Choi 2004, 2005). Both are using a qualitative approach to explore
the dynamics of a personal network and the role of the political party
in the elections of Riau, Yogyakarta, and Toraja. Their research reveals
that the personality of candidates is important to win a local election.
However, at the same time, a political party also plays a great role. The
degree of both personal and institutional is different though, depending
on the area where the election takes place. The research conducted by
Buehler (2009) in Toraja, South Sulawesi finds that an area dominated
by agricultural and rural cultures still holds admiration at a certain level
to aristocracy and tends to undermine the role of an institution such as
a political party. However, Indonesian politics at the elite level is also
marked by the willingness of a political party to influence the political
process in a local election. This finding is confirmed in Choi’s research
in Riau and Yogyakarta. However, despite the eagerness of local party
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol2/iss1/4
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elites to influence the local politics, the research using quantitative
approach shows that the final decision is at the hand of the voters.
Mujani and Liddle (2012), for example, confirm this conclusion that
the voters are keener to have greater space to evaluate the contestants
in an election, although their research is based on the general election.
Nevertheless, in many cases, including Indonesia, local elections do not
always replicate what the party or candidate has achieved at the national
level. As the local elections are designed to choose individuals or pairs
to secure executive positions, candidacy becomes an additional factor
besides party itself. Hence, focusing on the importance of candidate
for the voters is more important.
In the discussion of local elections, several studies confirm the importance of candidate in the eye of voters. Many believe that in local
election candidate is more significant to attract voters to represent them
in the national parliament. This underlines the difference between
local and national elections in term of the role of candidate. In the
British case, it is revealed that the personal aspects of candidate only
have a modest influence on his or her votes in the national election
(Norris, Vallance, & Lovenduski 2002). Another study in Canada also
confirms that local candidate only influences an insignificant number
of Canadian voters (Blais 2003), but again it is based on the election for
national representation. Different from the national or federal election,
in elections for local chief executive such as governor, mayor, or regent,
the candidate’s credentials are far more essential. In the US experience,
for instance, a candidate for governor may have to struggle to raise
funds and to develop a network of volunteers to help in or with the campaign. A political party is not playing a great role and sometimes leaves
candidates of the same party to compete in the same local election.
In the context of Indonesia, only very few studies, if any, investigate
factors that influence voters in choosing a candidate during a campaign.
Hence, to initiate the study of how a candidate wins local election this
study uses analyses that have been discussed in other local election
in a more advanced democracy. One of the handful efforts to summarise possible factors of how a candidate in local election wins is
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2016
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conducted by Lieske (1989) who puts them into conclusive factors based
on legitimacy theory. He mentioned three factors that contribute for
an individual candidate to get more votes: ascribed (sex, age, religion
& ethnic) and achieved (education & occupation) personal character;
political resources (incumbency & campaign expenditures); and the
partisan and newspaper endorsement received (Lieske 1989, 153). This
paper will discuss these three factors to find the possible explanation
of the PKS declining popularity in Jakarta.
R ESE A RCH M E T HOD

To support the argument, this article looks into data related to factors
for urban candidacy in a local election. Three factors are explored in
this article as they are likely to play a role in the Jakarta gubernatorial
election in 2012 and all data are obtained from secondary sources that
are available in many sources from previous reports, scientific articles,
as well as news in media. However, not all data are available in these
written sources. To analyze the tendency of candidates in relation to
media and public, their campaign media on the internet, as well as the
presence of each candidate in one of the internet search engines, are
explored. In general, this method is located within a qualitative method
and more specifically, case study as it aims at elaborating a specific
topic in a case. Consequently, there will be no general conclusion that
can be generated from the case in 2012 as it has different contexts and
complexities when compared to other gubernatorial elections in the
capital. However, this case study may offer a distinct proposition for
further discussion on urban local candidacy.
T H E PK S A N D E L EC T IONS I N I N D ON ESI A

The PKS is an Islamic party that was established in 2002 as a continuation of the PK following the fall of Soeharto and his New Order regime
in 1998. The PK was established immediately after the opportunity
was available by the new government but failed to pass the electoral
threshold after gaining only 1.8 percent of votes in the 1999 general
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol2/iss1/4
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election. Consequently, it had to change into the PKS in order to be
able to participate in the next election. It was part of the new era in
Indonesian politics to introduce political reform based on democratic
principles. The new reformed regime has given opportunities for the
ideological party to establish and involve in a competitive political process, especially in an election. After being oppressed by the previous
regime, Islam is still the most attractive source of values, other than
Pancasila, for the new parties and among 48 contestants for the 1999
elections 12 of them declared Islam as their ideology while another
eight aimed Islamic voters as their target (Fatah 1999, 132). However,
only five of them could survive obtaining minimum votes to pass the
electoral threshold to secure seats in the parliament. In total these five
parties received 37 percent of votes. After five years in politics, there was
no significant improvement when their votes were stagnant in the 2004
general election. The performance of Islamic parties was even worse
in 2009 as their votes dropped to slightly less than 30 percent (Aspinall
2010, 105-106), which was seen by some scholars as the decline of Islamic parties in Indonesia’s electoral process (Fealy 2009) although still
have significant influence in political life (Tanuwidjaya 2010).
Despite the relatively low achievement of Islamic parties in general
in the national elections, the PKS has recorded different outcomes.
First, in the 2004 election, the party significantly increased its votes
from 1.6 to 7.34 percent. Second, it performed well in several big cities
when it became the most popular party in Bogor, Bekasi, Bandung,
Medan, and the capital Jakarta. It is believed that the success was part
of the ability of the party to capitalize on the demand to have a better
Indonesia. At that time this was a general feeling among many voters
after the reform era and the hope was expected to be fulfilled by the
party’s image of ‘clean and caring’ (Nurdin 2010, p. 543-544). This
image was attractive enough for many first-time voters as well as the
middle class in urban areas who were fed up with corrupted politicians
and ineffective bureaucrats. This is one of the explanatory factors of why
the party was able to get more votes in big cities rather than rural areas.

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2016
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After relatively successful electoral participation until 2004, the party
has faced a difficult time when its involvement in the Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono cabinet brought the party into problematic positions. When
dealing with an unpopular policy such as increasing the gasoline price
in 2005 for instance, at first the PKS strongly opposed and criticised it,
a position admired by the public. However, the PKS finally accepted the
policy after having a meeting with the President. Since then, the party
seems to have lost its promising image of the reform party. It was not
able to repeat the 2004 success in the 2009 general election. The latter election was relatively stagnant where the party lost its position as a
popular party in big cities. Only because of its ability to penetrate more
regions (provinces) the party could maintain its votes at the level of 7.88
percent (Hidayat 2009). The stagnation of the PKS was also partly due
to the corruption scandals allegedly involving some of its prominent
figures as mentioned before (Aspinall 2010, 106), an opposite image of
the party’s commitment to the jargon of ‘clean party.’ This image seems
to fall completely when its president, Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, and one of
its governors, Gatot Pujo Nugroho, was taken into custody by KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) in 2014 and 2015 and put on trial for
graft and bribery. The first was related to raw beef import allocations
and the case was opened by the Commission only weeks before the
2014 national election. While this case was strongly rejected by most
of the party cadres, toward the second, the cadres were relatively calm
accepting the fact that religion and the jargon of ‘clean party’ cannot
guarantee its party elites not to commit immoral and unlawful behavior
while in office .
The decline of its popularity in big cities can be seen at the PKS’s
performance in the local elections, especially in Jakarta. Following the
success in the 2004 election, the party strived to compete in the local
elections in the capital. There are two local elections in which the party
involved by offering its own candidates, in 2007 and 2012. The local
election in 2007 was the first direct election in the capital to choose
a governor and vice governor and the PKS nominated Deputy Chief
police force, Adang Daradjatun, to compete with former vice-governor,
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol2/iss1/4
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Fauzi Bowo. All parties in the capital supported the latter candidate to
impede the PKS possible domination over Jakarta, which is seen as ‘a
honey pot’ (Schonhardt 2012) that control a local budget of almost $22
million at that time. Although the party’s candidate was able to attract
44 percent of votes, it was not enough to beat the opponent and the party lost its momentum following its strong legislative election showing.
The second attempt was in the 2012 local election when the party
also put forth a candidate for the governorship. However, unlike 2007,
PKS did not enter the arena as the favourite. The PKS slipped into the
third position after the PD (Partai Demokrat or Democrat Party) and
PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) in the local parliament. Although it had offered its most popular cadre at the national level, Hidayat Nur Wahid,
who is a former head of MPR (Majelis Permusyawarakatan Rakyat or
People’s Consultative Assembly) from 2004 to 2009, the result was still
disappointing. Paired with an economist affiliated with PAN (Partai
Amanat Nasional or National Mandate Party), they only received 11
percent of the vote, finished in third place and thus failed to compete
in the second round.
The party’s performance in two local elections is disappointing
considering its popularity in Jakarta after the 2004 general election
and the 2007 local election. Other than its popularity, there are also
several positive expressions being addressed to the PKS to admire the
party’s distinctive character. Nakamura (2005), for example, explains
that it has the image of hope after its criticism toward corruption and
its commitment to social welfare. This image, according to him, has
attracted many members of the younger generation in the urban areas,
as the party is also associated with the well-educated and the middle
class who strongly prefer its non-violent message. Therefore, it also has
the image of promising improvement as it is associated with the spirit
of reform and transformation in keeping with Islamic values. It is the
only Islamic party perceived to be different yet in the same box as ‘red
parties’ as this party offers substantial change (Fatah 1999).
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In short, the PKS has been able to transform Islamic values into
imagination and activities that can be understood universally by the
public. Different from other Islamic parties that clearly symbolize their
identities and program as ‘Islamic’, the party chose to adopt universal
values of Islam as their identity. The word Keadilan (Justice) and Sejahtera (Prosperous) refers to Islamic universal goals. The party’s approach to Islamic interpretation also follows the moderate, non-violent
and social ideology of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
Although the relationship between achievement in the national and
local election is seen as insignificant by scholars, the failure to maintain
the party’s popularity in Jakarta as reflected in the defeat of two local
elections is still noteworthy to be explored. As a city with the predominant population of Muslim and Betawi being the native community
associated with the religion, the PKS identity as an Islamic party and
universal interpretation of the religion should be beneficial to attract
many votes in the elections. The fact that religion played a role in the
dynamics of a local election in the capital shows the potency that could
be maximised by the party.
However, the 2012 gubernatorial election was held in a relatively
gloomy picture of Islamic parties. During the year, there were several
surveys examining the popularity of political parties in Indonesia. For
Islamic and Muslim based parties, the result of a survey conducted by
the Indonesian Circle Survey (LSI) showed that they would only garner
21 percent of votes if the general election were held in September (the
Jakarta Posts, 15 October 2012). More strikingly, none of the Islamic or
Muslim based parties is in the top five and they would only be voted
by less than five percent of respondents. Another survey conducted
by National Survey Institute in early October 2012 also indicated the
similar trend that the PKS would only receive 4.4 percent of the vote
and the support for Islamic and Muslim based parties would be slightly
above ten percent (Osman 2012). Although the pre-election survey has
several aspects to be debated in term of methodology and the fact that
there are a significant number (around 36 percent) of undecided voters,
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the findings have indicated that Islamic parties are less attractive when
the local election in Jakarta was held.
It is then understandable that the PKS nominated Hidayat Nur Wahid to enter the competition in order to reclaim its past glory in Jakarta
(the Jakarta Posts, 2 June 2012). He has a good reputation and claims
respect among the party’s members and Indonesian public after serving as the head of MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat - People’s
Consultative Assembly in the period of 2004 – 2009, although his role
was limited only to lead less than ten times of joint meeting between
the lower house and Senate. However, despite his respective figure as
former head of the Assembly and humble person with a strong background as an intellectual in Islamic studies, his nomination failed to
attract significant votes in Jakarta.
After three general elections in Indonesia since its first in 1999, it
is revealed that the new tendency of party identification was still relatively significant. On the contrary, the latest election was also marked
by the growing of evaluation on political parties after two periods of
government under direct president elections (Mujani & Liddle 2012).
Indonesians now have a chance to evaluate the party’s performance and
the main basis of the assessment is the economic situation that they
experience affecting legitimacy of political parties and their candidates
in local elections.
DISCUSSI NG T H E PK S ’ S C A N DI DAT E I N 2012
JA K A RTA GU BER NAT OR I A L E L EC T ION

Ascribed Personal Factor
Lieske clearly mentions that the personal factor is a key in a local election, not in general election to represent a particular region in national
level. This is also the case in Jakarta that the electoral supports for a
party in the general election do not have a direct relationship with the
result for a candidate in the gubernatorial election.
The PKS has been supported by 23 percent of votes in the 2004 election and 18 percent in the 2009 election. In local parliament, or DPRD
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(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or Local People’s Representative
House), the PKS obtains 18 seats in both 2004 and 2009. However,
from 2004 to 2009 the local parliament had 75 seats in total and it was
expanded to 100 since then. Therefore, the proportion of the party’s
representation had declined from 24 as the leading party to 18 percent
in third place.
However, on many occasions, the party had expressed optimism that
its candidate would win the election based on the result of the national
election and expected that voters’ electoral preference was relatively
constant. For the latter, one of the arguments is that in the previous
local election, the PKS candidate had garnered 44 percent of votes
which would support its candidate again in 2012. The President of the
PKS said on one occasion, “Now they are split into six pairs, while the
PKS remains unmoved. We will maintain our constituents and win
the Jakarta” (Dipa 2012). His comment was directed to the fact that
there are six pairs of candidates for the election and assumed that the
44 percent of votes for Adang Daradjatun, the PKS candidate in 2007,
still support the party’s candidate in 2012. Another tendency in relation
to a local election is calculating the national election votes for local
election, vice versa. After the party’s member won the North Sumatra
local election in March 2013, the new President explained that the
province is a miniature of Indonesia because of its plurality. ‘Winning
the province’ to get gubernatorial position ‘is a sign that the PKS is accepted in plural society and in the future, our party will be accepted
in more plural society’ (Asril 2013).
In the case of Jakarta gubernatorial election, it is clear that candidate
is the main source of voters’ choice in the ballot box, not the party. The
table below confirms the assumption that political party is not the factor for a candidate to win the local election in gubernatorial position.
The table below clearly reveals that party identification in Jakarta
is relatively weak, which confirms the findings of Mujani and Liddle’s
research after the 2009 national election. The favorite candidate and
incumbent, Fauzi Bowo, had a wide range of support with the PD as
his major party combining with two Muslim based parties, the PKB and
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PAN. If party identification worked and Jakartans followed the political
line of those parties, he should have received approximately 42 percent
of votes. In fact, he was only supported by 34.05 percent, 8 percent less.
The case of the first round winner, Joko Widodo, is more convincing
in this context because the voters are not completely in parallel with
the political party’s stance. While he was only supported by the PDIP
and Gerindra with only 15.9 percent of votes in the 2009 general election in Jakarta, he could gain more than 46 percent three years later.
Therefore, demonstration that party identification is difficult to find in
local election may be seen in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election.
Table 1
Result of Jakarta Gubernatorial election
Candidates
Fauzi Bowo –
Nachrowi Ramli
Hendardji Soepandji – A
R Patria
Joko Widodo –
Basuki T P
Hidayat Nur Wahid –
Didik J Rachbini
Faisal Basri –
Biem T Benjamin
Alex Noerdin –
Nono Sampono

Supportive Political Party 1st round
Potential
votes*
PD, PKB, PAN, Hanura,
42.32
faction in PDS
Independent

1.98

PDIP, Gerindra

15.9

42.60

PKS

17.23

11.72

Independent
Golkar, PPP, faction in
PDS

2nd round
Result (%) Potential Result
votes**
(%)
34.05
52.42
46.18

42.60

53.82

4.98
11.62

4.67

Source: KPU Jakarta
* based on the 2009 general election for Jakarta
** based on votes in the first round and supports of other candidates

For many spectators, this phenomenon is perceived as a positive sign
that rationality is growing among the voters to abandon ascribed identity
of the candidates as an important electoral factor and seek for a better
candidate to lead Jakarta (Basuki 2012). This is also confirmed by the
fact that the legitimacy some candidates wanted to develop had also
failed to work effectively. Fauzi Bowo and his vice governor candidate,
Nachrowi Ramli, are Betawi, the native people of Jakarta who are then
perceived by the Betawis as a legitimate candidate to lead the capital.
Based on this, Fauzi Bowo deliberately maximised the image of being
a native that is also associated with Islam to attract other non-native

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2016

15

Jurnal Politik, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4

20

JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 2, NO. 1, AGUSTUS 2016

Muslims. In a cosmopolitan city of Jakarta, this strategy to represent Betawi identity may have displeased other ethnic groups (Sukarsono 2012).
Hidayat Nur Wahid also had a similar strategy in maximising the
identification with people of Jakarta. If the incumbent maximised ethnic identity and religion, he and his vice candidate preferred orange as
their identical color in combination with Batik motif. Batik is a widely
known motive strongly related with Javanese, a dominant ethnic group
in Jakarta with around 35.5 percent of the Jakartans. He and his team
deliberately chose the color and the motive to attract two different identities at the same time: football supporters and Javanese (in Jakarta, the
most popular footbal team is identified with orange) and Javanese.
It is quite common in Indonesia that football is often used for political purpose. There are cases that local leaders helped to support a
popular football club in their region in order to gain popularity. This
strategy also used by the PKS candidate in West Java when Ahmad
Heryawan unexpectedly won the governor position by choosing blue as
his color during a campaign in 2008. It is not a coincidence that blue is
the color of a very popular football club in the province’s capital: Persib
Bandung. Therefore, depicting a particular color is crucial to develop
identification with popular preference. In the case of West Java, this
strategy worked at some points, apart from the significant factor of his
vice candidate, popular actor Dede Yusuf who was the cadre of the PAN
symbolically recognized by blue color.
That is one of the likely reasons of why Wahid did not develop his
image with Islam strongly as the voters were assumed to know him as
the candidate of an Islamic party. The color of orange is not regarded
as the color of Islam that is otherwise characterized by white or green.
By choosing the color, it was expected that he and his party were able to
penetrate different potential voters who have less association with Islam.
It is also a strategy to reduce suspicion that the PKS and its members are
are strict Muslims along the lines of the Wahhabism fostered by Saudi
Arabia. The term is negatively perceived by even by many Muslims in
Indonesia as ‘traditionalist’ particularly characterized by the idea of the
Islamic state of the party (Sukmajati 2011).
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However, his strategy ran ineffective because other factors and candidates undermined this symbolization. Although football supporters of
Persija are significant, the year of 2012 was marked by severe conflict of
PSSI, the national football authority, that led to the division of football
league, including the most popular club in the capital: Persija. There,
enthusiasm toward football activities was insignificant and replaced by
condemnation rather than support or admiration. While at the same
time, his effort to attract Javanese voters was challenged by the figure
of Joko Widodo, a mayor of Solo who can represent Javanese identity as
well. Although Wahid did not encourage this ethnic sentiment strongly
and Joko Widodo did not take the same strategies as well, the latter position as mayor of Solo significantly undermined Wahid’s association with
Javanese. Solo is the cultural capital of Javanese in Central Java province, while Klaten, the hometown of Wahid, is only a peripheral town
in Javanese ideas. Moreover, such strategy is perceived as conventional
and it can be easily overcome by the attractive strategy as practiced by
Jokowi. Jokowi and Purnama easily got more attention in this field by
using more eye-catching shirt: red-and-white checked shirts. The symbolization of this pattern is more convincing for the voters as it gave the
impression of candidates of the people (Fealy 2013, 108)
In short, for Jakartans, the ascribed identity of the candidate is neither ethnicity nor religiosity (Basuki 2012). They also have loose loyalty
to a political party when they have to choose a person to tackle the
daily life of Jakarta and manage its problems. Religiosity for Indonesian,
in general, is embraced in moderate interpretation and every Muslim
does not have any obligation to follow her/his religion’s teaching when
it comes to political aspiration. The position is taken by two major
Islamic social organizations of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah which then become the stumbling block of any Islamic party
to penetrate Muslims in Indonesian because the majority of them, or
75 percent, describe themselves as having an association with those two
organisations, whether active or passive (Mujani 2004).
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Achieved Personal Factor
Another personal character that is relevant to influence voters is the
achievement that is what a candidate has achieved in her/his education
or occupation. In this aspect, Wahid and his vice candidate have significant benefits since they hold doctorate degrees in Islamic studies and
economics. Wahid spent his school in pesantren, an Islamic boarding
school, before he flew to Madinah for his doctorate degree. His vice
candidate is known as an academic who holds doctorate degree from a
university in the Philippines. Before serving as a lawmaker from 2004
to 2009 with the PAN, he taught in several universities and became a
respectable economic analyst. No other candidates have similar credibility in term of achievement in education, except Fauzi Bowo.
Wahid is also nationally known as a respectable politician from the
PKS. Following the success to increase seats in parliament in 2004,
the PKS was able to grab the position of head of People’s Consultative Assembly, a joint institution of House of Representatives and DPD
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah – Regional Representative Council) a US
Senate-like institution. During his leadership, he showed to the public
that he was a humble person who was willing to refuse state facilities
(Kompas, 14 October 2004). The public had praised his attitude, as
it was an unusual behavior of politicians in Indonesian political life.
He was also the candidate for House of Representative who received
enough votes to claim his seat from Central Java in the parliament
directly in the 2004 national election. In the election, candidates for
the House had to gained minimum of BPP (Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih
or known in single transferable vote system as Hare quota) to get the
seat without depending on transfer of vote from other candidates from
similar party in the same district. Only two lawmakers (the other lawmaker is Saleh Djasit) in the parliament who were able to have similar
performance and he was one of them.By having those achievements
and records, the party was hoping that it could attract the middle class
in Jakarta because it offered well-educated candidates. In addition, the
PKS was also aware that it had to win the Jakarta election to boost its
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol2/iss1/4
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confidence in preparation of national election in 2014. Winning the
capital is a strategic political benefit that may deliver the party to become a major political player in Indonesian politics. After unproductive
negotiations with other possible candidates before the PKS announced
Wahid’s candidacy, the party strived hard to find agreement with Fauzi
Bowo to accept the party’s member as his vice gubernatorial candidate.
Failing that, the PKS had to embrace the election without any support
from other parties, similar to the 2007 local election. However, the 2012
election was more competitive due to the quality of candidates who applied for the election. Other than Fauzi Bowo, the incumbent governor,
there was also Alex Noerdin, the governor of South Sumatera. Alex
was supported by Golkar and had a good reputation in the province
to provide better services for the residents, especially in education and
health services. There was also Faisal Basri, a respectable economist
and academic, who ran in the election as an independent. Faisal was
widely known as young academic in 1998 to join reform movement
against Soeharto and joined a party that was established by Amien
Rais, an important figure in the process of political change (turbulence
sounds negative) in that year. Therefore, he had the image of having
brilliant new ideas that may bring changes in Jakarta.
However, among the candidates, Joko Widodo popularly known as
Jokowi was a contender who had strong appeal to the voters. He was
accompanied by Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, a Chinese business person.
Both did not have good education background when compared to Wahid and Fauzi Bowo or Faisal Basri because originally they were active
in the business sector. However, both had a dazzling record as mayor
and regent in Solo and East Belitung. Jokowi marked good achievement in reforming public services in the city of Solo. Purnama also
had a good record during his regency by providing free health service
for every resident.
In this aspect, although his personal character is appealing as a welleducated candidate with a good record of humbleness and religiosity,
Wahid was unable to attract more votes when compared to what his
party garnered. His effort to associate himself with the popular football
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supporters was also ineffective. It is clear that voters in Jakarta were
not significantly affected by ethnic and religious lines. Of course, a
candidate such as Fauzi Bowo has influential ties with native people
and Islam since he had more votes than Wahid who are equally in
incumbency. In the second round, Jokowi was accused of being a nonreligious person by a popular singer to undermine Muslim votes, a campaign that was also circulated in social media. However, this campaign
did not have a great impact to Jokowi’s electability due to Indonesian
voters’ growing rationality, especially in Jakarta (Mujani & Liddle 2010).
P OL I T IC A L R ESOU RCES

In the local candidacy, as Lieske has mentioned, other factor to play a role
for winning local election is the availability to have political resources
in the form of incumbency and campaign. If Wahid has the strongest
appeal on personal factor, in these he and his team had a quite serious
problem compare to other frontrunner candidates. Lack of incumbency
and relatively ineffective campaign strategy were quite obvious.

Incumbency
The failure of Wahid’s candidacy is also an obvious example of how
incumbency is crucial in the aspect of political resources of a candidate.
Both Jokowi and Purnama have developed reputations for integrity and
good governance in previous elected positions in other regions (Bev
2012). This kind of reputation was absent for Wahid. His role as the
head of People’s Consultative Assembly, although nationally recognized,
was different from what Jokowi and Purnama had established. As a head
of the highest institution in Indonesian political hierarchy, his role is
to lead joint session between two branches of parliament. This was a
role of managing the session mostly in ceremonial fashion unless there
is an effort to amend the Indonesian constitution. Moreover, the joint
session was conducted on very limited occasions of the inauguration
of the new president and vice president as well as examination of the
report from previous president.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol2/iss1/4
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v2i1.80

20

Hidayat: An Islamic Party in Urban Local Politics: The PKS Candidacy at th
AN ISLAMIC PARTY IN URBAN POLITICS

25

As mayor and regent, Jokowi and Purnama had greater chance to
conduct activities that were directly related to residents’ needs. Jokowi
has the reputation of a mayor who was willing to visit every corner of
his city to meet residents from different levels or groups. One of his
phenomenal achievements was to relocate street sellers that occupied
a public place to designated areas. While conflict and clashes are the
common consequences of relocation in Indonesian urban areas, Jokowi
was able to relocate them peacefully. This happened due to Jokowi’s
approach to the sellers after 54 times of meeting to discuss and negotiate
conditions of the relocation. For the success, Jokowi was invited to present the process in one of the UNON forums in Nigeria on 9 April 2009.
Another candidate, Fauzi Bowo was also an incumbent; while Alex
Nurdin was the governor of South Sumatera. Their candidacy has resulted in the highly competitive election in term of incumbency. In this
context, it does not necessarily mean incumbency of Jakarta. It refers to
the situation that the candidates have served as either governor or mayor
or regent in a city or regency. Therefore, it is expected that leadership
experience in local context should enhance their electability.
Alex Noerdin was completely embarrassed as his incumbency did
not have any impact at all. Wahid had received a better result, but unfortunately, it was not enough to boost his votes. He also failed to defeat
Fauzi Bowo who suffered from a negative reception from the Jakartans
due to his inability in tackling acute problems of traffic jam and flood
as well as ineffective bureaucracy. His lack of real candidacy experience
in dealing with urban problems has resulted in low level of votes.

Campaign
For Lieske, the campaign in the examination of candidacy in a local
election is based on how much money that a candidate spends. By looking at the campaign expenditures it is likely that the different efforts of
each candidate can be evidently examined. It is hypothesized that having much money in an election is measured by the ability to raise more
funds to support campaign activities. More funds mean that more leaflets can be distributed and more media coverage can be produced. In
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short, money can be used to ‘buy recognition’ (1989, 155-156). However,
studies related to the significance of funds for the campaign and then
winning election have revealed more complex conclusions. It is said that
money is more important for the challenger than the incumbent (Jacobson 1978, 1985, 1990) as the latter can maximise their service to citizen
or constituent during their term in office or Parliament. Therefore, the
challenger needs to put more effort to advertise its profile more than
the incumbent does (Gerber 1998). Thus, analyzing the ability to win
an election based on candidates’ success to raise more fund does not
always working straightforward and can be misleading. Although elections in Indonesia are seen as flawed due to the role of money to buy
votes before ballot box and after when all votes are counted (Aspinall
and Mietzner 2010), the way candidates market themselves in front of
the public is still important in choosing a local leader. In Indonesia, it
is noted that it can be diverse from ‘pomp’ to ‘piety’ (Lindsay 2009) or
‘inter-religious’ to ‘inter-ethnic’ (Aspinall, Dettman, & Warburton 2011,
42-43). However, there is also a tendency that internet-based media also
played significant role alongside the more common campaign modes.
Wahid and his success team themselves embraced them too and implemented different types of campaign.
The most common form of a campaign is a public meeting with the
mobilisation of hundreds to thousands of cadres and sympathizers in a
hall or open space which is quite popular in Indonesian elections, either
local and national. All candidates, including Wahid, are still fond of this
type of campaign. The PKS that supported him prepared the campaign
to develop the image of professionalism dominated by orange and batik design. As usual, this type of PKS campaign was usually attended
by thousands of its cadres. The party seemed to understand that this
campaign was actually not too effective in reaching the wider public as
it was only attended mainly by its cadres. However, the party did it anyway as the main purpose of having an open campaign (parade) was to
show the public that the candidate had significant real supporters (can
also activate your supporters to get them advocating your candidate in
their neighborhoods). It is also for image building when Wahid visited
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol2/iss1/4
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many places in Jakarta in order to get closer to ordinary people as well
as community leaders. The traditional market seems to be one of the
main targets to visit as Wahid would arrive at the site using traditional
vehicles such as becak, cart, or motorcycle mostly with his trademark
of orange-colored batik shirt. There are also some occasions that he
or his vice candidate attended social activities managed by the party’s
cadre at the community level including native musical performance.
In the recorded activities, he explained his vision to lead Jakarta under
the tag of ‘Ayo Beresin Jakarta’ or ‘Let’s Settle the Problems of Jakarta.’
Many of his activities were recorded by his volunteer organized PKS
TV and then uploaded to YouTube. Perhaps, this is part of their effort
to reach the voters through the internet, which is easier to access in
the capital and becomes a new strategy in the local elections for all
candidates. In conventional theory, it is said that the media endorsement is crucial to the success of the candidate in a local election and
it can be analyzed from the report and editorial point of view, or media bias, which can influence the readers (Chiang & Knight 2011).
However, local elections in Indonesia generally have shown different
phenomenon as the candidates strived to reach the reader directly. Two
different strategies applied by different candidates can be underlined
here. They are Internet-based campaign and greeting the voters directly.
The first was mainly maximised by Wahid’s campaign team as they
documented a significant number of Wahid and his running mate’s
activities in videos and uploaded them on the internet. Varieties of
videos were also uploaded to the online video service hoping that his
vision and activities could be accessed by internet users. PKS TV has
produced approximately 170 short videos and made them available on
YouTube. It shows that Wahid’s team worked seriously and the party as
his support helped him.
However, the videos did not attract significant internet users. Many
of them were only hit less than one thousand users and only less than
five were watched by ten thousand users. Although this figure is obviously better than what Fauzi Bowo’s team did with only less than
30 videos produced by his campaign team and some of them were
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2016

23

Jurnal Politik, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4

28

JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 2, NO. 1, AGUSTUS 2016

only watched by less than a hundred, his videos were far less attractive compared to Jokowi’s videos in YouTube. Gerindra that supported
Purnama, Jokowi’s his vice gubernatorial candidate, produced some
videos with more sophisticated quality. One of the videos showing his
explanation of how he would govern attracted more than a hundred
thousand internet users. Compared to Hidayat, Jokowi’s explanation
about how to tackle problems of congestion was more convincing with
concrete proof of similar problem-solving in Solo during his mayorship.
His program of health and education service and the way of tackling
the ineffectiveness of bureaucracy in the city were also successful. He
claimed that he would deterministically fire a bureaucrat not complying
with his reform in improving public services. In Solo, many of them
had been fired accordingly. As usual, he also showed his calmness and
humbleness during the presentation and sometimes he made laughed
at his self upon making mistakes.
Similar to Wahid, there were also some videos uploaded to support
him and one of them was hit by more than one and half million users
after it was available on YouTube on 16 August 2012 (Cameo Project
2012). One of the winners of parody competition produced the highquality video and dedicated for Jokowi. Other than that, the video could
represent the feeling of the Jakartans fed up with chronic problems of
traffic and corrupt bureaucracy’s failure to tackle the city’s problems.
It is clear that incumbency is not always a positive factors in winning
the trust of votes as it may give negative impact for the incumbent to
confirm scholars’ findings (Anderson & Glomm, 1992). The mostly
Chinese-descendant participants voluntarily developed the video. They
even did not know Jokowi before and never met him. According to one
of the producers the video was produced as an expression of young
people who wanted to have true change in Jakarta. Besides that, they
also aimed at endorsing undecided voters to come to the ballot box
in the second round (Wibowo, 2012). Beyond that, there are also several accounts of social media who create account voluntarily to inform
about Jokowi. He mentions that on twitter there are @jokowicenter,
@jakarta_bangkit, @jbkaskus, @jakartabaru, @relawanmudajakarta,
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@info-kemeja, @jokowibasuki, @projakarta, and @rumahrelawanJB
(Nugroho & Nugroho 2012).
In attracting middle class who have access to the internet, although
Wahid gained support and produced significant numbers of video, Wahid failed to answer what the Jakartans needed during the campaign.
Again, attractiveness, message and the ability of a candidate to offer
tangible breakthrough to voters are significant. To compare, Jokowi and
Purnama’s campaign could reach different segment more effectively by
using community visit, social media and introduce popular songs and
slogans attractive to young voters. The figure below also shows that
Jakartans who have access more to the internet were more interested
searching for Jokowi than other candidates. Wahid was simply not the
candidate to look at by them who were mostly young and middle class.
In both campaign periods, for the first and second round, Jokowi always
became the first to search on the internet and it was not comparable
to others even in the second round when there were only two pairs
of candidates. Figure 1 below shows the insignificant interest toward
Wahid in one of internet search engine.
Figure 1
Interest on Candidates by using Google Search

Source google.com

In term of campaign expenditures as Lieske has mentioned, there is no
relation between the amounts of fund used to support the campaign
with the triumph of the candidate in the 2012 Jakarta election. According to KPU Jakarta, the local election commission, Jokowi as the
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winner spend 27.05 billion rupiahs for two rounds of the campaign and
16.09 billion rupiahs for his campaign in the first round, 11 July 2012
(Afifah 2012). Compared to Fauzi Bowo, the figure is significantly lower
because the incumbent spends 62.57 billion rupiahs for two rounds.
Jokowi only spent one billion for programs on TV and radio and most
of them were cheap campaigns of direct community visit (Teresia &
Ebo 2012). Jokowi did not like his team producing a huge number of
banners since it would mess up public space in Jakarta. Wahid himself
spent only 13 billion rupiahs and most of them were collected from the
PKS members (Toriq 2012). For the party, the relatively small amount
of funds for a campaign, especially in media, is one of the main reasons
for Wahid’s failure. Aboe Bakar Al Habsy, one of the Deputy of the
PKS explained that, “This is not because of our cadres training or party
machine cease working, but it is due to the PKS’ financial limitation”
(Merdeka.com, 12 July 2012). Nevertheless, his claim was not entirely
accurate by looking at the campaign expenditure of Jokowi and Fauzi
Bowo. These figures confirm the previous studies that campaign expenditures are not guaranteeing electoral success. However, the relatively
small amount of funds spent by Jokowi and Purnama as challengers is
quite unusual. Different variables other than money were surely working in this context.
Wahid’s expenditures were not too different from Jokowi’s expenditures in the first round although he had arranged many campaign
activities, including online media to inform the public about his vision and activities. Despite his efforts, it seems that his campaign was
not able to attract significant numbers of Jakartans. However, he still
obtained 11 percent of votes showing that there were pockets of votes
in favor with his candidacy. One of the answers of this is the ability of
the PKS to mobilize its members for election. The PKS is known as
the only political party that has been able to mobilize its members to
conduct on-political activities to protest bad practices in the country
and performs such extra constitutional activities as humanitarian missions (Muhtadi 2012). Therefore, members in all regions are engaged
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in electoral tasks to help the party’s candidate since the party’s member
are heavily involved in the electoral process.
One of the best political strategies of the PKS is political canvassing which was proven crucial in winning some of the local elections,
particularly in West Java as well as the national election in 2004. It is
the strategy that members of a party visit every community household
and introduce particular party or candidate for election hoping that the
eligible member(s) of the household vote for them. The PKS conducts
this strategy in every election either national or local, including the
Jakarta election. Party members who conduct this activity are usually
trained by the party to develop skills and boost confidence in facing
unexpected reaction from the community. They also ask for permission
from community leader beforehand so that their presence in a community is legal. During the visit, the party members do not have any
obligation to impose their candidate if the person they visit is reluctant.
In that case, they only suggest giving a reminder that the election is
coming in the following weeks or days and ask her/him to register and
vote at the ballot box.
With this kind of approach, there was no guarantee that the person who has been visited by the party’s members would automatically
agree to vote. In the USA, the effectiveness of this strategy has been
widely discussed with mixed conclusion. Some argue that it only gives
inconsiderable effects on how voters behave while others explain that
it provides more chances to win an election (Gerber & Green 1999).
Although it has an effect on electoral success, it will only apply to certain candidates. Therefore, the party’s claim that its political canvassing
strategy is part its success in previous elections, national and local, can
be easily misleading. It is proven that the strategy cannot boost the
electability of Wahid although the PKS has a good record of success in
the previous election.
Jokowi’s success also confirms that the absence of canvassing as
his campaign strategy does not have any correlation with insignificant votes. He and his team implemented community visit rather than
household visit and his team uploaded his visit to meet with the comPublished by UI Scholars Hub, 2016
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munity in slum areas promising to improve their neighborhood with the
concepts of ‘kampong deret’ and free health service (KJS). His belief
that city development should start from Kampong was more appealing
than the idea of other candidates, including Wahid who merely promised to increase the budget for a community without giving concrete
program for the extra funds. However, the most influential effect of
Jokowi derives from media.

Media Endorsement
As a non-regional leader, Wahid and Rachbini did not have any strong
appeal for urban issues and many of their programs were neither attractive
nor concrete to be consumed heavily by media. From months before the
election, the attention of the media had been focusing on the incumbent
and potential contenders such as Alex Noerdin and Faisal Basri. Noerdin
even grabbed more attention at the early months prior to the election as
he spent more to advertise him at various media (either online, newspaper, or television). Fauzi Bowo then dominated the media afterward by
ordering more advertising about him. However, Jokowi became the media
favorite just weeks before the first round. His winning as the front-runner
at the first round election may well explain the tendency, while the money spent on advertisement contracts is reported higher than others are
in the early months (AJI 2012, 57). Nevertheless, it has to be underlined
that the media coverage has given more attention to Jokowi even before
his announcement as the candidate from PDIP because of his excellent
record as mayor of Solo and a possible move to race for gubernatorial
position in Jakarta. Wahid was an immediate candidate after the PKS did
not find any agreement with other political parties to support candidate
together. As a result, media attention was relatively minimal when compared to others. It is reflected in the findings of a research conducted by
AJI revealing that he only recorded over 300 news of him. This figure is
relatively low when compared to that of Jokowi (nearly 700) and Fauzi
Bowo (more than 500) (56).
Jokowi had become a political star in Solo. As a mayor, he had
recorded many achievements that had been impossibly achieved by
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other mayors. His ability to relocate street sellers without any conflict
has amazed the public and the winning record of 91 percent for his second period as mayor confirms this as well. He has also a lot of creative
ideas to tackle the problems in Solo that may become the alternative
leadership to other regions. With this success and public expectation for
alternative leadership, media captured this opportunity and broadcast
him more after the momentum of his announcement to use a car produced by Indonesian mechanical secondary school as mayor official car.
Starting from his brave announcement about the local product preference, he turned into a public figure and even political celebrity. A
social analyst for ICG wrote that ‘He may not be a Jakartan but there
is no politician Indonesian broadcasters love more than the telegenic
Jokowi, who in his trademark of the checked shirt is comfortably talking with people in slums and vocal in fighting corruption’ (Sukarsono
2012). As a consequence, the public is also driven by the media coverage to accept his achievement. Mietzner has a similar impression for
Jokowi that it is a combination of a creative campaign team to use
popular culture and intensive coverage by media and it has increased
his popularity in Jakarta (Sambhi 2013).
According to Nugroho (2012), the intensive coverage is related to
uniquely distinctive character and approach of Jokowi in the politics of
Indonesia. His uniqueness has attracted is attractive to media to have
news on him. After his inauguration as governor the coverage went on
and some of his meetings led by him or by vice governor can reach
more than a million of hits in social media. Journalists competed for
each other to follow him every day to have a headline about him.
Media effect is quite powerful in deciding the fate of the competition because his contenders, Fauzi Bowo and Wahid are having different space and perception in the media. Fauzi Bowo was perceived as
a failed governor as he was unable to solve the frustrating problems in
Jakarta. His magic word of ‘give it to the expert’ in undermining Adang Daradjatun, a vice police chief, in the local election of 2007 had
turned against him after five years in office. Fauzi Bowo’s ‘rigid style
and distanced relation to the people’ (Yew-Foong & Bhakti 2012) had
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made him unpopular for media and the right angle to cover him as the
incumbent was his inability to build better Jakarta. His style was also
difficult to reach young voters and those who were more technologically
savvy in the social media, a strategy that was admitted as his weakness.
Wahid also had a problem in front of the media. Although he and his
success team have strived to develop an image that fitted with his and
his vice candidate credential, he was not at the center of media coverage. It was always between Fauzi Bowo and Jokowi (AJI 2012).
CONCLUSION

The nomination of Hidayat Nur Wahid in the 2012 Jakarta election
was an immediate decision by the PKS. He and his party only had one
month to make preparation which later had to be altered to support a
different candidate. This has put the party in a difficult situation to
develop a suitable and convincing appeal to the Jakartans. The party
depended greatly on his personal reputation as a religious and humble
person who obtained a doctorate degree in Islamic Studies from Madinah. He is known as a respectable person and relatively popular among
Indonesian public after serving as the head of People’s Consultative
Assembly. Among other candidates, only Fauzi Bowo has the similar
overseas degree.
This aspect of legitimacy for the candidate in the local election
seems to be the only legitimate variable that Wahid has. He lacked two
other factors to be the real contender: political resources and media
coverage. He had insufficient sources to convince the voters of the gubernatorial position as he had no experience in local politics and dealing with issues in urban politics. In the campaign, he strived to position
himself as a person for all by maximising symbols of color and batik.
He seemed to minimise the usage of Islamic symbols as he thought his
personality as Muslim was already in the public’s mind. However, his
and the party’s effort to penetrate plural communities in Jakarta, beyond
identity lines, did not work very well due to the growing rationality of
the voters. He and his campaign team were unable to be more popular
by maximising popular culture and creative approach. Many of the
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videos produced by the party’s media team were old fashioned and he
was not interested in media coverage to increase his popularity forcing
his team to depend on canvassing. The latter strategy seemed to be effective to penetrate members of the community but its effectiveness to
change voter behavior is doubtful both in theory and practice.
It is also important to note that the pattern of communication used
by candidates has changed significantly. Conventional media was not
the only medium for the voters to get information as there is a tendency
to use direct communication strategy through online media, social media, or face-to-face meeting. Wahid and Rachbini campaign team had
taken optimal efforts to utilize this media. However, their conventional
approach during community visit and their uploaded videos were not
attractive. Likewise, Fauzi Bowo suffered the similar fate as Jokowi has
maximised his popularity as mayor of Solo and his humble but effective
campaign strategy.
Jakarta local election confirms that the figure of a candidate does
still matters. However, a particular figure is more important than others.
For such Islamic parties as the PKS, having a strong personal character
in term of religiosity and positive behavior based on religious values
is inadequate. An anti-corruption as depicted by the Islamic party is
not attractive enough since there is no evidence that personal honesty
will also be effective in improving local bureaucracy and solving the
problems in the city. Experience, in particular, previous success, and
expectation are partly influential as shown by Jokowi, a variable absent
in Wahid and Rachbini. In short, unless Islamic parties are able to offer a candidate with a capacity to tackle urban problems it seems that
urban votes are highly unlikely to be on their side, although they share
the similar religious identity.
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